approximately 10,000 Arabs served in the area. 4 Most volunteers were based in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities bordering Afghanistan. They included humanitarian aid workers, cooks, drivers, accountants, teachers, doctors, engineers and religious preachers. They built camps, dug and treated water wells, and attended to the sick and wounded. 5 Arab volunteers with jihad as a goal mostly came in the late 1980s.
Yet, despite their marginal military role in the anti-Soviet campaign, Arab Afghans acquired many of the elements necessary for sustained violent activism. A substantial number of volunteers participated in military training camps established by the Pakistani intelligence services and run by commanders of mujahidin factions. These camps gave Arab Afghans skills in guerrilla warfare and terrorism. 6 In addition, many of the Arab Afghans were socialized in takfiri ideologies (which declare as apostate secular regimes in the Muslim world). Vigilant security services to prevent zealots from distributing the works of radical ideologues did not exist, and governments were unable to counter the takfiris with their own breed of establishment Islam. 7 No less important were the network ties that were forged between diverse factions and nationalities. These networks became important for moving jihadists from one conflict zone to another, and they facilitated the acquisition of money and forged passports. 8 Most critically, the Arab Afghans experience produced capable leaders, religious ideologues and military commanders who would play vital roles in places such as Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia and Chechnya.
The Dispersion of Arab Afghans
The year 1992 was perhaps the most important for the dispersion of Arab Afghans. The Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989 and the Afghan communist regime fell in 1992. Many of the Gulf volunteers went back home and were treated as heroes. Other Arab Afghans became assets of regimes and their security services. This was especially the case in Yemen, where the returning Arab Afghans were given a haven and were deployed against the socialist establishment of the former South Yemen. 9
Those who did not reintegrate or serve as assets of governments embarked on a militant path. Four archetypes emerged:
1. Facilitators of Jihad. Many Arab Afghans saw their role as facilitators of jihadist movements in their home countries or around the world. Facilitation included training, financing and sheltering jihadists in Pakistani camps and guest houses. It also encompassed smuggling weapons, forging travel documents, printing propaganda materials and serving as communication liaisons between clandestine individuals. Facilitators also produced ideological and theological justifications for militant groups. These facilitators were mainly in Peshawar, but they also emerged in Europe (London in particular), Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan after the rise of the Taliban.
2. National Islamic Revolutionaries. Some Arab Afghans, particularly those from Algeria and Egypt, saw an opportunity in the early 1990s to overthrow their own regimes. Although the Algerian and Egyptian veterans did not initiate the insurgency in their respective countries, their skills, networks and experience helped the insurgent movements tremendously. 10 3. Global Jihadists. A number of Arab Afghans took their training, experience and networks to other conflict zones, especially Bosnia and, later, Chechnya. Their aim was to aid fellow co-religionists in their own struggles for secession or liberation. Roaming jihadists used a variety of means to enter conflict zones. The most common was illegal infiltration with the help of professional smugglers or through bribing local officials and border security agents. Others posed as humanitarian activists, relief workers, or journalists seeking to cover a war zone. Some relied on fake passports, even diplomatic ones, acquired through forgers in Pakistan or Europe. 4. Unaffiliated Terrorists. Less common were the volunteers who carried out successful and foiled terrorist attacks in the name of Islamic causes either in their home countries or in the West. An exemplar of this pattern is Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center attack. In 1990, he went to Afghanistan to train in the Khaldin camp, run by Arab volunteers. He trained for about six months, learning weapons tactics, basic explosives and military maneuvers. He graduated to a more advanced course in remote-controlled bomb-making and experimented with some explosives in Afghanistan's civil war. He used his connections in Peshawar to acquire an Iraqi passport, which he used to enter the United States. 11
Comparing Arab Afghans with Foreign Fighters in Iraq
Although Arab Afghans were a relatively small group that had little influence on the course of events in Afghanistan, they were able to carry out terrorist attacks around the world, start new national and transnational terrorist cells, aid several insurgent movements, build camps to train future generations of radical Islamists and launch a surprise attack on the only remaining superpower in the world. These considerations do not bode well for the dispersal of jihadists from Iraq. Foreign fighters in Iraq are more threatening than their Arab Afghan predecessors in several respects.
Exposure to Combat
Foreign fighters in Iraq have been exposed to intense combat since the Iraqi insurgency escalated. Unlike Arab Afghans who fought less on the battlefield, the foreign fighters in Iraq engaged coalition forces in direct combat, carried out car bombs and suicide attacks, deployed a range of improvised explosive devices and rockets, conducted kidnappings and beheadings, shot down aircraft, engaged in complex attacks against hardened targets and assassinations of high-value personnel, and intimidated the Iraqi government, the majority Shi`a population, and, more recently, Sunni insurgents and tribes that oppose them. 12 Networking Jihadists in Iraq are connected to experienced trainers, gun runners, human smugglers, guns-for-hire, criminals, forgers and other radical Islamist groups. AQI has transformed its largely foreign membership into an Iraqi one through cooptation and money. Deposed Ba`athists that cannot be integrated in the new Iraqi order may find a home in the global jihadist movement as gunsfor-hire or facilitators of jihad. Although the Afghan mujahidin did not join al-Qa`ida's global movement in the 1990s, this may have been a practical problem of language. Iraq's Ba`athists speak Arabic and can mix with the Arab-dominated global jihadist movement. This was not the case with the Afghan mujahidin.
Despite the clear advantages available to Iraq's foreign fighters over their Arab Afghan predecessors, three factors could mitigate their threat potential in the future.
First, foreign fighters are the main supply of suicide bombers in Iraq, which means they will not be around to threaten other states. 13 Second, neighboring states are not likely to offer fleeing jihadists an inviting safe haven akin to the one Pakistan offered Arab Afghans in the 1980s and 1990s. The Arab Afghans were able to move between Pakistan and Afghanistan with relative ease, settling in Peshawar's many guest houses and training camps without fear of harassment or arrest. Iraq's dispersing jihadists will not have such a haven to exploit. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey are aligned with the United States and have been targets of radical Islamists. Therefore, they have no incentives to shelter fleeing jihadists.
Syria and Iran might choose to provide a safe haven for fleeing militants, but they will do so discretely to avoid incurring further hostility or military action from the United States. Jihadists that go to Iran and Syria will not be able to set up camps like the ones that developed in Pakistan during the 1980s or under the Taliban in the late 1990s. Absence of an inviting safe haven next to Iraq means that dispersing jihadists will have to cross multiple borders and acquire documentation to enter distant havens. This, in turn, increases their vulnerability to detection and arrest. Many foreign fighters in Iraq have to turn over their cell phones, money and passports to smugglers or the insurgent groups that host them. 14 If they choose to leave, they will have to acquire money and forged documents to cross multiple borders to make it back to their homelands or new destinations.
Finally, dispersing jihadists will encounter vigilant Arab and European governments that are aware of their potential threat. During the Afghan campaign, Arab and European governments took in returning volunteers because they were aided by some of these governments to fight the Soviet Union. Volunteering for Iraq, in contrast, is considered a criminal act by most of these governments. Returnees from Iraq will encounter arrests, interrogation and possibly surveillance to make sure they are not a threat. European governments are not likely to welcome jihadists in their territory as they did Arab Afghans during the 1990s. These governments are on the lookout for jihadists seeking to destabilize their countries or take advantage of their territories.
Conclusion: Policies for Countering the Threat of Dispersing Jihadists
The experiences of Arab Afghans suggest several lessons for containing the potential threat coming out of Iraq.
Lesson 1-Conflicts Attract Jihadists
Many Arab Afghans went to where the action was located-Bosnia, Chechnya, Algeria and Egypt. Jihadists who wish to leave Iraq in the near future are likely to seek other conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia, where they are likely to be welcomed by fellow militants in need of support. Foreign fighters might also seek to join insurgent Islamist groups in North Africa, especially in Algeria.
Lesson 2-Jihadists Exploit Safe Havens
Dispersing Arab Afghans exploited safe havens and governmental support in Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen. All three countries had populations sympathetic to jihadism, were relatively weak states and harbored political calculations that involved exploiting militants for national or regional interests. Therefore, countries and communities with populations sympathetic to jihadism and governments unwilling or unable to deny a haven to jihadists are at risk of attracting dispersing foreign fighters in the near future. Pakistan's tribal regions, where radicals have been receiving shelter since the 1980s and where al-Qa`ida's core leaders are believed to be currently based, is the most likely destination of fleeing jihadists. Another possible destination is Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon because those camps are policed by Palestinian factions, not the Lebanese government.
Lesson 3-Networking is the Key to Success Arab Afghans during the 1990s benefited from the network ties that developed during the anti-Soviet campaign. It took network links to enter into new conflict zones, finance training camps and acquire forged documents to move from country to country. Facilitators of jihad in Pakistan, Europe and Sudan were the backbone of the emerging al-Qa`ida global network and the key to its high-profile operations. Foreign fighters in Iraq have succeeded in forging new network ties with former Ba`athists and Sunni insurgents. Therefore, dispersing jihadists are likely to exploit these networks to exit from Iraq or build connections between facilitators inside Iraq and terrorist cells outside the country.
Governments concerned about the threat of dispersing jihadists can pursue a number of measures: -Prioritize the problem by making programs that track the movement and dispersion of jihadists a top intelligence priority. Counter-terrorism departments must dedicate resources and personnel to monitor dispersion from Iraq and track its development over time. They must also develop databases on terrorism incidents with links to Iraq-based groups to look for patterns in network facilitation, methods and tactics.
-Treat emerging conflicts where local Muslim actors are involved, weak states and ungoverned regions as potential magnets for dispersing jihadists. Collaborate with allied intelligence services to anticipate the influx of militants into these areas and develop information on smuggling networks and routes that may facilitate the transfer of dispersing jihadists. Routes to Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas should be a top priority because al-Qa`ida is likely sheltered there and has strong support structures in both countries.
-Provide allied intelligence agencies the names of Iraqi and foreign detainees in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq. These individuals should be flagged for additional scrutiny at border entry points. Immigration agencies should also have access to the names of former detainees and known foreign fighters in Iraq in case they apply for asylum as Iraqi refugees.
-Assist states to improve the quality of their passports and update their border control technologies to make it difficult for individuals to enter their territories with falsified documents.
-Engage in a robust diplomacy to dissuade governments from offering unofficial safe havens to fleeing militants. Impose sanctions and threaten the assets of substate actors and political parties that shelter returning jihadists for militant purposes (especially in Yemen and Pakistan).
-Develop extradition treaties and repatriation protocols to facilitate the handover of apprehended foreign fighters and fleeing jihadists. European governments in the past refused to extradite individuals to countries with dismal human rights records and capital punishment. Therefore, it might be advantageous to encourage Arab governments to provide assurances that extradited militants will not face extrajudicial punishments or death sentences in order to facilitate their repatriation from Europe.
-
Explore offering amnesty and reintegration programs to repentant foreign fighters seeking to exit the path of jihad. Those who return and provide information on their networks could be given immunity from prosecution or reduced sentences to be served in rehabilitation centers similar to the Saudi model. 15 These measures comprise a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of dispersing jihadists. They make the process of dispersion more difficult, expose militants to the risk of being apprehended at borders, deprive them of support networks and new safe havens, facilitate their repatriation to their home governments and encourage them to exit the path of jihad through rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Combating Terrorist Financing at the Agency and Interagency Levels
By Dennis M. lormel the united states responded immediately and decisively to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Terrorist financing was, and continues to be, an integral element of the counter-terrorism strategy. A core requirement for a successful terrorist organization is funding. Disrupting the flow of funds between the source and distribution points diminishes the ability for these groups to succeed. This was one of the most important lessons learned following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorist financing became a significant focus in the U.S. government's war on terrorism and had to be dealt with on both the agency and interagency levels. Each agency having a nexus to terrorism had to establish entities and internal mechanisms to deal with terrorist financing. The methodologies developed and implemented needed to be innovative and inclusive. The interagency had to develop a meaningful and effective mechanism for initiative prioritization, coordination, cooperation and information sharing. Today, combating terrorist financing has become an important tool in the U.S. government's counter-terrorism arsenal.
Where We Have Been
The interagency formed an informal Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for Terrorist Financing in late 2001, and it was formalized under the National Security Counsel (NSC) in 2002. All agencies with a nexus to terrorist financing participated in the PCC. The PCC identified the highest terrorist financing targets and developed strategies to deal with them. The primary focus of the PCC was on State and Treasury Department led designation and sanctioning actions that were supported by information provided by all participating agencies. The Department of Justice (DoJ) played a prominent role in this process.
The
PCC evolved into the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) on Terrorist Financing. The CSG, like the PCC, is a coordinating group that has no authority over the participating agencies.
The 9/11 Commission determined that the PCC was generally successful in marshalling interagency resources to address terrorist financing following 9/11. 1 Interestingly, the government has come under periodic criticism for not having one agency, entity or individual with authority over all agencies engaged in terrorist financing activities. 2 During at least the 2002-2004 period, a subgroup from the PCC involving the NSC, Treasury, CIA, FBI and State met on a weekly basis to discuss criminal and intelligence investigations or operations and to continuously prioritize interagency targets. 3 The priority financial targets identified by this group were primarily investigated by the CIA and FBI in conjunction with each other. Led by the NSC, State and Treasury, this group also developed a strategy to deal with getting Saudi Arabia engaged in terrorist financing issues.
At the agency level, the 9/11 Commission further determined that the post-9/11 interagency response was focused and driven by a sense of urgency concerning terrorist financing. 4 The PCC succeeded in coordinating and prioritizing interagency activities to include diplomatic actions, sanctions and designations, and intelligence and criminal investigations. In great part as a result of this coordinated effort, the 9/11 Commission Report Card graded the government A-for its efforts in terrorist financing. This was the highest grade given the government. 5 Immediately following 9/11, both the CIA and FBI took steps to coordinate more effectively on combating terrorist financing. The CIA established the Financial Operations Group (FINO), while the FBI created the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS). Within a week, FINO and TFOS established a joint working relationship. As the relationship grew and with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, each entity assigned personnel to the other's operation and initiated an unparalleled information sharing mechanism. FINO and TFOS developed proactive strategic and tactical methodologies and initiatives. In addition, TFOS conducted historic or traditional financial investigations involving the review and analysis of financial records. The key was the development and implementation of time sensitive mechanisms.
For the first time, financial intelligence and the transactional flow through the financial system were used for strategic, tactical and historic purposes. Strategic financial intelligence was collected and used for analytical purposes to identify emerging trends and establish proactive strategic financial investigative methodologies. Financial information was used from a tactical perspective to engage in proactive financial investigative initiatives. From the intelligence and law enforcement standpoints, this was extremely productive. Treasury, FINO and TFOS participated together in a highly classified and successful operation tracking the flow of financial information. TFOS provided transactional information to an allied government in a near real time capacity that prevented at least four terrorist attacks in that country. 6 Financial information was used by TFOS, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Customs Service and other law enforcement agencies to build historical or traditional reactive investigations requiring the comprehensive review of financial books and records. 5 9/11 Commission, "Report Card," 2005. 
DoD's Role in Countering Terrorist Financing
Prior to 2004, the Department of Defense (DoD) had a limited role in terrorist financing and only participated passively in the PCC. It did not have initiatives or operations specifically focused on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, DoD intelligence components did support the FBI, CIA and other law enforcement and intelligence terrorist financing operations. For example, when Iraq was invaded, FBI agents were selectively embedded with military intelligence to collect information on al-Qa`ida. This included agents from TFOS, who coordinated forwarding financial intelligence to TFOS for analysis. Subsequently, TFOS and IRS agents were deployed to Iraq and worked with DoD conducting financial investigations and intelligence collection. In addition, TFOS deployed teams of agents on a rotating basis to Guantanamo Bay to identify detainees believed to be knowledgeable about terrorist financing. With DoD support, TFOS conducted numerous interviews and developed useful lead information.
In August 2004, CENTCOM established the Threat Finance Exploitation Unit (TFEU). 8 The TFEU had small groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. They went beyond terrorist financing and identified the underlying problem more broadly in the context of threat finance. DoD considered the problem two-fold. There was terrorist financing, and in the broader context there was threat financing, which included weapons of mass destruction funding, narco-trafficking, organized crime and human trafficking. 9 The primary focus of the TFEU in Iraq was on the insurgency, while in Afghanistan the top priority was narco-trafficking. In developing the operational concept, DoD sought to capitalize on its military resources in theater. By capitalizing on these resources, the TFEU has functioned as a valuable financial intelligence collection mechanism. This tool can be used to identify and destroy enemy threat targets. It also serves as a mechanism to share information with the interagency. Treasury has played a very active role in working with the TFEU, and DoD considers Treasury the lead agency in this area. 10
There have been a variety of media reports concerning threat finance successes in Iraq. 11 The evolution of threat finance within DoD began at the grassroots level and progressed at a slow pace. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has responsibility for leading the DoD global war on terrorism. By 2006, all geographic commands were putting together threat finance cells. In addition, SOCOM dedicated resources to work in conjunction and coordinate with the interagency community in Washington.
DoD is perfectly positioned with its global presence, reach and resources to more fully engage in threat finance and the collection of financial intelligence in support of its 9 Ibid., p. 50. military objectives and the interagency terrorist financing mission. Thus far, DoD has failed to maximize its threat finance capabilities and has not established a policy for the same. 12 DoD is, however, engaged in a number of productive initiatives with the interagency. Treasury, for example, continues to work closely with the TFEU in Iraq. DoJ has begun a targeted initiative with the TFEU in Iraq, and DoD has assigned an officer to coordinate this project at DoJ. DoD and the FBI are working in conjunction with each other on a number of cases.
The interagency strategy between 2001 and 2003 was to use the full weight of government powers to combat terrorist financing. This included coordinated diplomatic actions, designation and sanctions, law enforcement and intelligence investigations. As the 9/11 Commission Report Card reflects, this was a success. An important element, however, was missing: military action. Since 2004, DoD has played an increasingly important role in the government-wide terrorist and threat financing initiative. Adding military action to the arsenal of diplomacy, sanctions, law enforcement and intelligence provides the government with its most robust terrorist and threat financing capability.
Where We Should Go
The interagency community must continue to evolve both at the agency and interagency levels. The challenge is that the enemy is cunning, as terrorist groups are learning organizations. 13 They are adept at avoiding detection and exploiting financial systemic vulnerabilities. Methodologies must continue to be developed, implemented and enhanced that disrupt and minimize the flow of terrorist and threat finance. One means to achieve this is the collection of financial intelligence that can be strategically applied to identify emerging trends. This trend analysis would be beneficial in the development and implementation of tactical operations. This is particularly important for military and law enforcement operations. The most significant areas of vulnerability or weakness to terrorists and terrorist organizations are communications and finances. These areas consistently lead to the disruption and dismantlement of terrorist groups and activities. Although terrorists consistently change their methods of operations and demonstrate adaptability at avoiding detection, they must communicate and raise and spend money to function. Government strategies should focus on the disruption of funding flows. The optimal situation would be to trace terrorist funds back to the point of origin and forward to the terrorist strike team or cell. This would enable the government to take action to disrupt and dismantle the identified funding stream through intelligence, investigative, Treasury enforcement, and/or military action.
To accomplish this, investigators must identify three funding tracks. First, identify funding flows between a terrorist network or organization and the point of origin. Second, identify funding flows from the network or organization to fund operations, including organizational operations and specific terrorist activities. Third, identify funding flows from operations to individuals, cells or groups.
Collecting financial intelligence information and conducting analysis to identify emerging trends should be utilized in developing strategic and tactical strategies at the agency and interagency levels. Agencies must then balance agency priorities with the priorities of the interagency CSG as part of the overall government counter-terrorism mission.
Training is the one area where the interagency has been inadequate. Training models should be developed and implemented at the agency and interagency levels. There should be a broad awareness overview for most agency personnel about the terrorist or threat financing function and responsibilities of the agency. Comprehensive training is needed for personnel assigned or interested in assignment in terrorist or threat finance. This training should include legal instruction to ensure personnel are cognizant of legal parameters and sessions on dealing with the financial and business sectors. The training should provide an overview of the jurisdiction and responsibilities of other agencies having a nexus to terrorist or threat finance. Many individuals in one agency do not understand the capabilities or responsibilities of other agencies. These sessions should contain workshops addressing interagency issues and impediments to sharing information or working together.
Overall, the interagency has consistently done a good job in dealing with terrorist and threat finance. Nevertheless, it must conduct regular self-assessments to enhance its capabilities. It must be vigilant in identifying emerging trends and continue to develop innovative techniques. The interagency must ensure there is a consistent level of coordination, cooperation and information sharing. In so doing, there is a better expectation that U.S. national security will be safeguarded. 
Dennis

Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot
By petter Nesser identifying clear trends in jihadism in Europe has proved difficult. 1 A jihadist terrorist plot in Germany in the fall of 2007, in which German converts to Islam played key roles, testifies to the increasing complexity and amorphous nature of the jihadist threat. The case illustrates that, more often than not, the distinction between "homegrown" and "international" jihadism in the European context is vague in terms of organizational affiliation and motivational landscape. Another lesson learned is that despite alternative sources of recruitment, radicalization and training for jihadist networks on the internet, Europe's mujahidin still value and seek out real life training and personal interaction with organized groups and experienced fighters abroad. 2 From a counter-terrorism perspective, the case shows that Western security services have increased and improved international cooperation and their capacities to deal with the changing realities of transnational jihadism.
A Conspiracy to Kill Americans
On September 4, 2007, German police arrested three terrorist suspects in Oberschlehdorn, Westphalia for allegedly planning and preparing three powerful car bomb attacks against U.S. interests and citizens in Germany. The core of the cell consisted of two German converts to Islam and one Turkish immigrant. They were in contact with, and received training, support and instructions from, a Pakistan-based Uzbek jihadist group called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).
The suspects had gathered large quantities of chemicals and military detonators. They discussed several targets, including Frankfurt International Airport and the U.S. Ramstein military airbase, as well as a restaurant/discothèque frequented by Americans. At the time of the arrests, they were in the process of manufacturing explosives (based on internet recipes) in a cabin in Sauerland, Westphalia. The chemical hydrogen peroxide was to be the main component of the explosive. A similar chemical was used by the London bombers and by a number of al-Qa`idaaffiliated terrorists worldwide. The suspects had gathered what amounted to more than 700 kilograms of the substance, loaded into 12 barrels. The chemical had a concentration of 35%, and theoretically it could have created an explosive force equivalent to 500 kilograms of TNT. The detonators, believed to have originated from Syrian stocks, were smuggled into Germany from Turkey by a German-Tunisian teenager, sewn into a pair of sneakers. 3
The anti-terrorism operation, dubbed "Alberich," was launched in October 2006 when the U.S. National Security Agency and the CIA informed German counterparts about internet communications between IJU in Pakistan and the suspects in Germany. Altogether, 45 individuals were put under surveillance during the operation. 4 The terrorist suspects knew that they were being monitored, and implemented several counter-surveillance strategies, such as coding their communications. Nevertheless, while protecting their communications, they also took actions that seemed irrational, or at least hazardous, given that they knew they were being watched. For example, the leader of the group, Fritz Gelowicz, gave an interview to the German media complaining about being persecuted by the authorities for no reason. 5 In another incident, one suspect shadowed by German agents walked up to the agents' vehicle and stabbed one of the front tires with his pocketknife. 6 On New Year's Eve 2006, Gelowicz and his accomplices drove a car back and forth near a U.S. military barracks in the town of Hanau; confronted by evidence, they claimed that they wanted to see "how the Americans celebrate New Year's Eve." 7
The Terrorist Profile The core of the alleged terrorist cell consisted of three individuals: two Germans and one Turkish immigrant. They have been named in the international press as Fritz Gelowicz (28-years-old), Daniel Schneider (21-years-old) and Adem Yilmaz (28-years-old). Gelowicz studied engineering; Yilmaz survived on odd jobs; and Schneider was unemployed after having served in the military.
The jihadist carrying the unlikely name "Fritz," characterized as the leader of the terrorist cell, was born in Munich and grew up in the southern German city of Ulm. By German standards, he hails from an ordinary middle class family. His father is an engineer, running a firm developing solar energy technology, and his mother is a medical doctor. His parents divorced when Fritz was a teenager. Former schoolmates say the divorce was a hard blow for the teenager, and some suggest that he turned to religion as a way of dealing with disappointment. His brother also converted to Islam, but, according to German authorities, he has never been involved with extremism. 8 Gelowicz enrolled to study engineering at Ulm University, where he became a member of an extremist Islamic study circle. During regular meetings at "Cafe Istanbul," members of the group legitimized the killing of Christians, Jews and infidels. Gelowicz also became part of the "extremist scene" at the Multikultur Haus in Neu-Ulm. He befriended Yehia Yousif, a medical doctor, who acted as a charismatic imam, leader and fiery Islamist activist within this community. Motivations and Connections to the IJU Gelowicz and his associates were driven mainly by fierce anti-Americanism nurtured by contacts and interaction with extremists inside Germany, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Their radicalization appears to have accelerated after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 11 Several incidents illustrate their strong hatred toward Americans. German agents, for example, observed one of the suspects and his friends trying to provoke fistfights outside a nightclub frequented by U.S. soldiers stationed in Darmstadt. When they failed to provoke any response, they slit the tires of American-made cars in the area. In a bugged conversation in a car, the suspects discussed potential terrorist attacks that only included U.S. targets. They talked about attacking airports and U.S. military barracks, and a disco with "American whores." "Gelowicz and his associates were driven mainly by fierce anti-Americanism nurtured by contacts and interaction with extremists inside Germany, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan."
Gelowicz and his cell received support from the IJU. The IJU was established in 2002 as a militant offshoot from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly with support from al-Qa`ida. 12 The original aim of the group was to fight against "infidels" in Uzbekistan, implying the regime of Islam Karimov. Soon, and probably as a consequence of its association with global jihadist networks, the group also started to focus on international targets inside Uzbekistan. In 2004, members of the IJU executed terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli representations in Tashkent. In recent years, the IJU has recruited fighters outside Uzbekistan (predominately Europeans and North Africans) offering training in Mir Ali, Waziristan. 13 The group's leader, Abu Yahya Muhammad Fatih, has claimed that the IJU is multinational, consisting of "believers from all over the world." 14 In an April 2007 statement, the IJU leadership announced that the group would step up attacks internationally. 15 Contacts among the German cell and the IJU appear to have been frequent, direct and enduring. The organization trained the activists, supplied them with bombmaking manuals and gave instructions on the timing of the attacks. 16 The IJU claimed responsibility for the attempted operation in Germany in a communiqué posted on a Turkish language web forum. 17 12 The group's leader said that "many brothers" contributed with "financial, moral, scientific and operational" support, but without specifying whether or not 
The IJU Cell: Between Homegrown and International Jihadism
It is difficult to situate the German cell within past and current patterns of jihadism in Europe. On the one hand, cell members could be considered "homegrown" because they were German citizens who became radicalized within Germany's jihadist communities. On the other hand, the activists connected with an Uzbek organization in Pakistan that trained them and exerted a significant level of control over their activities. In terms of motivation, focus on American targets and other signs of fierce anti-Americanism suggest that the activists emphasized the international or global dimension of jihadism (such as the U.S. military presence in the Muslim world, whether it was U.S. support for Karimov's regime in Uzbekistan, or military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
There has never been a clear distinction, however, between international and "homegrown" jihadism in Europe. When the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorized France in the mid-1990s, they recruited from disaffected Maghreb immigrants in French suburbs. The GIA mobilized around French interference in Algerian affairs, but also exploited growing frustrations among immigrants who found themselves stuck at the bottom of French society. When al-Qa`ida started to utilize Europe as an arena for attacks on U.S. interests around the turn of the millennium, the organization's recruiters also targeted frustrated immigrant youths, whom they cultured and trained in paramilitary camps in Kandahar, Khost and Jalalabad.
In general, Europe's "homegrown" terrorist cells have differed from cells controlled by the GIA and al-Qa`ida. The cells have been more "European" in terms of their sociology and motivations (cell members were second generation immigrants and converts, and, relatively speaking, were more concerned with local European policies affecting Muslims). Yet, while there are examples that jihadist terrorists justified operations in Europe with reference to European immigration policies (The Hofstad Group in the Netherlands) and the mocking of the Prophet Muhammad (the Danish caricatures), the global dimension, and especially European military contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, always appeared to be the most important motivational driver.
An important distinguishing feature of "homegrown" cells is that they involved "bottom-up" patterns of recruitment, in the sense that the activists themselvesinspired and radicalized by militant preachers and audio-visual propagandatook the initiative to link up with organized militant networks for additional guidance and training.
Conclusion
The German case seems to be consistent with "bottom-up" processes of recruitment to a certain extent, but at the same time it involved a strong element of command and control by an organized global jihadist group. This aspect of the case might indicate that jihadist organizations based in the Muslim world have regained capabilities to run operations inside Europe "hands on."
Another lesson learned from the Gelowicz affair is that despite possibilities for recruitment, radicalization and training via the increasingly sophisticated jihadist "internet infrastructure," personal, faceto-face interaction between recruits and experienced activists still plays an important role in radicalization processes. 18 Even though the activists had the opportunity to download a "terrorist start kit" from the internet, they still took the risk of mingling with Germany's jihadist crowd and international networks in the period leading up to the alleged time "There has never been a clear distinction, however, between international and 'homegrown' jihadism in Europe." of the attacks. They conducted extensive travel, attending language courses and religious training, and they consulted and trained with experienced mujahidin.
From a counter-terrorism perspective, the German case shows that despite the complexity of the threat, the security services have become better equipped to monitor and intercept jihadists through increased surveillance of travel and internet communications, in addition to monitoring Europe's extremist communities more closely. As a result, the terrorists acquire more limited levels of training and are unable to obtain high levels of professionalism. The fact that jihadists travel despite the security risks is in itself an indicator that the internet alone does not presently provide sufficient levels of training. The interception of the IJU cell also shows that the security services have improved international cooperation and the capacity to deal with transnational networks. Accordingly, "homegrown" terrorism constitutes a lesser threat today than it did just a few years ago because the element of surprise represented by the mujahidin that attacked Madrid and London, and the killing of Dutch artist Theo Van Gogh, no longer exists. The irony of it all is that it looks as if the weakness of "homegrown cells" is that they are not "homegrown" enough, but still dependent on international contacts and support. 19 
Petter
Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq
By Michael Gabbay the zeal and dexterity with which contemporary Islamist insurgent and terrorist groups convey their messages over the internet and satellite television channels is often cast as part of a public relations struggle with the United States over the hearts and minds of the Muslim masses. 1 In Iraq, it is apparent, however, that these media also increasingly serve as forums in which insurgent groups compete with each other for the loyalties not of the population at large, but rather of those who already support the insurgency, including insurgent fighters themselves. Accordingly, an analysis of insurgent rhetoric can provide a window into the factional structure and dynamics within the insurgency. This paper describes a quantitative methodology for constructing diagrams that characterize and clarify insurgency factional structure using insurgent rhetoric as data. These "factional maps" can shed insight into insurgent dynamics involving cooperation, rivalries, decisionmaking and organizational cohesion. The results suggest that the coarse-graining of the Sunni insurgency into a nationalistleaning camp on one side and al-Qa`idainspired jihadist Salafists on the other needs to be further resolved to serve as a guide for U.S. counter-insurgency policy.
Factional Mapping Methodology
The data used to construct the Iraqi factional maps includes 11 Sunni insurgent groups listed in Table 1 and spans the time period from August 2005 through April 2007, just prior to a process of alliance formation among the nationalist-leaning groups. The data set consists of hundreds of translated insurgent statements from jihadist websites and interviews of insurgent group officials in print and broadcast media as provided by the Open Source Center (OSC).
The notion of factional structure involves the integration of measures of: (i) insurgent 1 The author would like to thank Mohammed Hafez for enlightening discussions that helped contribute to this paper. This work was supported by the Office of Naval
Research under award number N00014-06-1-0471. group ideological or strategic differences; (ii) cooperative relationships between groups; and (iii) the overall influence of each group. The methodology fuses concepts from social network analysis and spatial models of politics, which frame political competition and voting behavior as occurring along a policy or ideology space. 2 For the ideology measure, differences in the mix of target classes that are claimed by insurgent groups are considered. The motivation behind this choice is that disagreement over what types of targets are legitimate has often been the primary source of dissension within Islamist insurgencies. 3 The value of a targeting policy variable is calculated, which essentially scores each insurgent group by the average legitimacy of the target classes it claims operations against, where the legitimacy of each target class is the acceptability of attacking it as perceived within the ensemble of insurgent groups (at least according to their public statements). 4 The targeting policy is plotted along the horizontal axis of the factional maps where lower scores indicate the presence of less acceptable, more controversial targeting claims.
For the cooperative relationship measure, the study analyzes the number of either joint communiqués or declared joint operations between groups; the strength of the relationship is indicated by the thickness of the links connecting groups in the factional maps. The overall influence of a given group is assessed via its prominence within the rhetoric of the other insurgent groups, under the assumption that more influential groups will be referred to more frequently by their insurgent brethren. 4 Each insurgent group's attitude regarding targeting a given class is rated on a 5-point scale: claimed = 2; legitimate (but not claimed) = 1; no clear opinion = 0; weak condemnation = -1; strong condemnation = -2. The average of its attitude values across the groups is the legitimacy of a given target class. Listed in order of decreasing legitimacy values, the target classes are: U.S. forces (2); Shi`a militias (1.7); Iraqi government forces (1.7); police (1.6); spies and agents (1.2); Kurdish militias (1.1); Iraqi civilian government (0.8); foreign civilians (0.6); oil pipelines (0.6); politicians (0.2); Sunni local leaders (0.1); Shi`a civilians (-0.6); and Sunni civilians (-0.8).
5 The prominence of a group is proportional to the num-
Group Symbol
Islamic Army in Iraq IAI 
Factional Structure
The factional maps are shown in Figure  1 . Considering targeting policy, the groups are more evenly dispersed over the spectrum than expected from a simple binary division into nationalist-leaning and jihadist Salafist wings. with the more selective cooperation between leadership elements required for issuing policy statements. The isolation of the jihadist Salafist groups-AQI and the Ansar al-Sunna group-on this leadership level is apparent. In contrast, the groups that are commonly considered to be more nationalist in orientation-IAI, MA, 1920RB, JAMI, RA-are all inter-connected, forming a clique in social network terms. Moreover, given the substantial spread of these groups in targeting policy, the factional map suggests that it is on the level of ties among leaders, rather than ideological congruence, that the lumping of these groups into a single, nationalist-leaning camp is most on the mark. In terms of targeting policy, the IAI, which trumpets operations against an expansive list of Iraqi targets-national forces, police, Shi`a and Kurdish militias, spies and agents, government officials, and politicians-is far closer to the ASG than it is to most of the nationalist groups. 7
It is striking that the IAI appears as the most prominent group and also at the center of the targeting policy spectrum. This is suggestive of a spatial politics paradigm in which positioning oneself at the location of the median voter is advantageous, but where the "voters" in this case happen to be the insurgency's pool of fighters and active supporters. Such a perspective implies that the IAI built up its power by appealing to both Salafists on the left and nationalists on the right-an inference about its factional composition that has crucial implications as will be analyzed below. The mixed composition of the IAI is also suggested by the joint operations network, where the IAI appears as a bridge between nationalist and jihadist Salafist groups. The IAI may, therefore, be better positioned than other nationalist groups to absorb fighters defecting from AQI in the wake of the recent degradation of AQI's capabilities.
A strong indication that targeting policy is indicative of broader ideological divisions is the fact that three major alliances of insurgent groups have nucleated around the most prominent group in each region of the spectrum: AQI's Islamic State of 7 The strong Salafist strain in the IAI's overall rhetoric is the fact that the PCIR's most prominent member is also its most extreme could have serious implications for the demands of the PCIR in negotiations, particularly with respect to power-sharing with Shi`a.
Nationalist Ideological and Strategic Divergences
This study suggests the conclusion that the spread of nationalist-leaning groups along the targeting policy dimension reflects fundamental differences in their underlying ideologies, goals and constituencies. If true, this could help explain the lack of greater consolidation among nationalist groups which would otherwise be puzzling given that their professed high level political goals are essentially identical: a territorially intact, non-federal Iraq with a basis in Islamic law and a place for all Iraqi sects and ethnic groups. This study's inference that the IAI's power base is composed of both Salafist and nationalist factions implies that in order to satisfy both constituencies, the IAI, for reasons of organizational cohesion and survival, must jointly pursue the goals that each constituency holds most dear; for the Salafists, that is Sunni Shari`a rule, and for the nationalists, it is an intact Iraq.
Accordingly, this paper contends that the IAI and its allies are deeply committed to re-establishing Sunni central rule in Iraq-a revanche, however, that is unmistakably religious in nature and for which heavy sectarian bloodletting is an acceptable cost. The IAI's declaration that the "Iranian occupation" is more dangerous than the U.S. one indicates that it is the Shi`a threat axis which is of highest priority. 9 The possibility that the IAI may be gearing up for a renewed sectarian battle is supported by its recent formation of special anti-Shi`a militia units dedicated to "purifying the land of Iraq from the Safavid enemy." 10 The IAI does not explicitly state its goal of seizing power, cannily calling for the formation of a technocratic government. The public presentation of a watered-down agenda with real goals concealed, as well as the instrumental formation of broad but loose coalitions, such as the PCIR, is classic insurgent strategy. 11 The supposition that the IAI is a mix of Salafists and nationalists, however, should also be borne in mind as it implies that the IAI's freedom of maneuver is limited and it could fracture if the twin goals of Sunni rule and an intact Iraq become ever more at odds.
In contrast, groups on the right side of the spectrum, such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Rashidin Army, have primarily a nationalist constituency. Consequently, they appear more committed to preserving the integrity of Iraq's Arab nature-within the context of an expulsion of U.S. forces-rather than imposing Sunni religious dominance. Although they no doubt harbor ambitions of seizing central power themselves, their strategy for doing so likely stops short of re-igniting a Sunni-Shi`a civil war. Rather, they may hope that in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, the acclaim that they and their religious authority-the Association of Muslim Scholars-would garner from their longstanding and consistent defiance of the United States, combined with the less hostile face they present toward the Shi`a, will translate into national political legitimacy and power. If this is indeed their strategy, they can be expected to publicly position themselves as the most implacable of foes to the United States. This may explain their absence from the PCIR, if that organization is indeed intended to provide a platform for negotiating with the United States, and would also be consistent with their growing criticism of the Awakening Councils. Yet, if faced with an increasingly real prospect of Iraq's partition, these groups would be more disposed to settle for a lesser goal of Sunni parity with the Shi`a, in which Sunnis are given what they perceive as a fair share of power in an Iraq freed of U.S. occupation. Tellingly, both the 1920RB and RA have dismissed the idea that the "Iranian occupation" is more dangerous than the U.S. one, which can be interpreted as both a rejection of a sectarian strategy and the notion that cutting a deal with the United States is the lesser of two evils. 
Conclusion
The factional mapping methodology presented in this paper uses insurgent rhetoric to generate a compact quantitative and visual representation of insurgency factional structure. Given the proliferation of insurgent groups in Iraq, the methodology provides a useful way of clarifying which groups are important, where they stand in relation to each other on an ideological and strategic level, and their cooperative relationships on a political and operational level. The use of targeting policy as an ideology indicator provides finer resolution of fundamental differences between insurgent groups than simply looking at their high level political goals. Consideration of declared political goals alone leads to overestimating the level of ideological congruence between the nationalistleaning groups, a misimpression that would be compounded by the apparently strong network of relationships among the leaderships of the major nationalist groups. Since the targeting policy is based on public rhetoric, it sheds light on the constituencies that insurgent groups rely on and compete over, and so can also be used to assess the factional composition within individual insurgent groups. This paper's conclusions about the different composition and strategies of the nationalist-leaning groups may have a crucial bearing on the trajectories of the Sunni Awakening Council militias currently cooperating with the United States given that they are reported to have a substantial number of former insurgents in their ranks.
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Jihadists Target the American Dream
By Brian fishman jihadist strategists are under no illusion that al-Qa`ida can destroy the United States militarily. As a result, jihadist thinkers have identified more creative strategies to mitigate U.S. military might, most of which attempt to exploit perceived social and political dynamics within the United States. These strategies are dangerous and often diabolically insightful. Such strategies are also overly optimistic, as they are often predicated on the faulty assumption that American society is inherently unstable and only needs a small push to degenerate into chaos. These strategies point to the complexity of al-Qa`ida's war on the West and illustrate why the U.S. response must be just as calculated.
Dividing America by Derailing its economy
In his seminal work, The Management of Savagery, Abu Bakr Naji argues that the power differential between the United States and its jihadist enemies is smaller than usually assumed. 1 According to Naji, the ability of the United States to control events around the world is based largely on a "deceptive media halo" that has convinced governments and individuals that the United States is capable of directing world events. 2 Naji argues that if jihadists can draw the United States into continual conflict in the Middle East, they can puncture this deceptive media halo. He also argues that the economic costs of such a conflict will spur internal social conflict in the United States, which will further undermine the halo. Naji believes that the United States is susceptible to internal conflict because the deceptive media halo papers over its own internal inconsistencies. According to Naji, by removing that halo, U.S. society will degenerate on its own. These arguments were applied to Iraq early in the war by the Anonymous author of Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Dreams, a jihadist blueprint for defeating the United Urging attacks on U.S. allies and Iraq's oil infrastructure, the author cites U.S. government reports to illustrate the high cost of the war. He ends the argument by triumphantly paraphrasing American pundits who argue that the war in Iraq is not worth the cost. Iraqi Jihad's author understands that the U.S. economy will not collapse under war expenses, but he is heartened by the disagreements those costs create in American society.
Targeting Race
Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi takes this argument one step further. Al-Qurashi posits that the dream of economic advancement is the only substantive social bond in American society. He is convinced that ethnic and racial diversity makes American society inherently unstable and concludes that if al-Qa`ida can sidetrack the U.S. economy, it can instigate racial strife that will weaken the United States:
it is clearly apparent that the American economy is America's center of gravity. This is what Shaykh Usama bin Ladin has said quite explicitly. Supporting this penetrating strategic view is the fact that the Disunited States of America are a mixture of nationalities, ethnic groups, and races united only by the "American dream," or, to put it more correctly, worship of the dollar, which they openly call "the Almighty Dollar." 4 During the past year, al-Qa`ida has accelerated efforts to divide the United States along racial lines. In a video released on May 5, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke glowingly of Malcolm X, apparently in an effort to attract support from African American Muslims. 5 Zawahiri mentioned him again in a December 2007 speech. 6 Zawahiri's endorsement of Malcolm X makes no theological sense for a selfdeclared Salafi-jihadist; Zawahiri's namedropping was base politics.
Cracking the U.S. Foundation
Not all jihadist efforts to generate discord within the United States are predicated on economics. Jihadists understand that the "American Dream" is an expansive concept that includes notions about liberty, equality and opportunity. In to subject the enemy to a bloody exhaustion-first, to bleed him dry economically, and then to bleed him humanly, socially, and psychologically in a way he cannot bear or compensate. This is what will lead him to defeat in the end and to turn in on himself, losing the ability, desire, or determination to continue the conflict. This will surely be accompanied by social and civil collapses within the enemy. At best, his state may disappear; at worst, his power to intervene in Muslim affairs will collapse. 7 Many of Mukhaddab's arguments about al-Qa`ida's successes in Iraq were premature. Since he wrote, the ISI has been condemned by jihadist scholars, isolated by Sunni tribal groups and chased out of many of its former strongholds. Operationally, al-Qa`ida in Iraq is in dire straits. Nonetheless, al-Qa`ida's supporters will likely claim a strategic success in Iraq because of the economic and social strain the conflict places on the United States. For Mukhaddab, sustaining direct confrontation between al-Qa`ida and the United States-rather than operational victories-is the best indicator of strategic success. Glued to Western media for signs of social tension in the United States, Mukhaddab believes that sustained confrontation with al-Qa`ida is eating at the very foundation of the country. As Mukhaddab sees it:
Al-Qa`ida has put a complete end to these foundations that hold together this doddering sinful society (The United States), held together as a society only by the values of personal freedom, the freedom to acquire, and the freedom of capital. As soon as these disappear, the bonds of the society, being based only on them, will of necessity dissolve. The collapse will become only a matter of time. It will take place when the citizens lose their patience over the disappearance of these foundations.
And this is what has begun to be clearly visible in American society. Everything we read, hear, and see of commiseration about freedoms and unease about the repression and restriction of freedom of opinion and freedom of capital is only the first sign of this unrest over the loss of the foundations of the building of this vulgar, materialistic society. 8
Mukhaddab's argument suggests that partisan shouting matches pitting national security concerns diametrically against civil liberties do not completely reflect the strategic threat jihadists pose. Just as the 9/11 attacks were designed to bait the United States into invading Afghanistan, Mukhaddab hopes that continued conflict with al-Qa`ida will bait the United States into undermining its intellectual foundation.
8 Ibid.
Mukhaddab's ideas are innovative, but that does not mean his strategy is viable. Like Iraqi Jihad's author, Mukhaddab's argument reveals that he misunderstands the utility of heated debates in a healthy democracy. There is no doubt that laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act spark impassioned arguments, but those disagreements hardly represent an existential threat to the United States. Considered within the historical scope of American efforts to balance civil liberties with national security concerns, these are solvable problems.
Key Issues for the Future
The vast majority of U.S. thinking about al-Qa`ida addresses the group's ability to strike the United States and its allies militarily. This is appropriate, as a government's first priority is to protect its citizens. Indeed, al-Qa`ida's ability to strike at the United States in creative and dangerous ways should not be underestimated. Yet, the focus on al-Qa`ida's military threat should not obscure the jihadist ideological assault on the American dream. The most important pieces of al-Qa`ida's strategy to undermine the United States are social and political, not military. There are a number of lessons from this fight that should be applied to the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qa`ida and its associated movements.
1. Keep the eye on the ball. Al-Qa`ida wants to prevent the United States from being able to project power around the world. Since its ability to do so is a function of military, economic and political strength, al-Qa`ida would like nothing better than to distract the United States from policies that bolster and safeguard those strengths. Fighting jihadists is not a grand strategy by itself. Policies that undermine the international trading system, American competitiveness versus growing economies, the ability to project (and credibly threaten) military action against rivals and the ability to contain state challengers do not serve U.S. long-term interests.
2. Jihadists understand the basis of American power. Naji, al-Qurashi and Mukhaddab correctly identify American ideals and economic strength as critical pillars of American power. Jihadists will target these pillars militarily, but they understand that in a war that will last decades, political and social attacks will be more effective. Al-Qa`ida has-and will again-attempt to bait the United States into military actions that undermine American social, economic and political strengths.
3. Jihadist thinkers assume that the American behemoth has a fragile core. Jihadists understand the power, but not the durability, of American ideals. Perhaps because of the religious grounding of their ideology, they do not fully comprehend the strength of a society built around secular concepts of liberty, equality and opportunity.
4. Jihadists will try to find credible messengers. Al-Qa`ida's leaders understand they are not credible messengers to the American people, which is why al-Qa`ida's most sophisticated propaganda videos cobble together commentary by Western pundits to advance their agenda. 9 Al-Qa`ida would like to invert the American strategy of finding and empowering voices that delegitimize al-Qa`ida among Muslims. For all of the reasons cited by Mukhaddab, however, Americans should be loath to stifle political debate for fear of manipulation by al-Qa`ida's propagandists.
5.
Jihadist predictions may backfire. Jihadist predictions of imminent social chaos in the United States serve an internal propaganda purpose. By offering prospective jihadists a blueprint for "victory," they excite people to join the movement. In the long-run, however, this is a double-edged sword. If confident jihadist predictions of victory do not produce results, potential supporters may lose faith in their leadership. 
Brian Fishman is a Senior
The Growth of Militant Islamist Micro-Diaspora Communities: Observations from Spain
By Kathryn Haahr the apparent ease with which predominantly foreign jihadists of the Salafist ideology are able to continually penetrate and manipulate the social, religious and professional spaces of micro-diaspora communities in support of global jihad indicates the strengthening of grassroots jihadist support structures. While the majority of Spanish Muslims are law abiding and consider themselves to be a part of Spanish civil society, increased numbers of what can be called a "third jihadist generation" are extending their base by leveraging socio-cultural and ideological variables. 1 This emerging jihadist space is concerning primarily because it indicates that a strict and orthodox ideology advocating violent jihad is motivating and convincing Muslims to radicalize. Spanish police and intelligence sources are increasingly concerned about the growing influence of young, second generation militant Islamists. 2 The aggressive nature of jihadist planning and recruitment activities in Spain highlights the need to have a counter-terrorism strategy that emphasizes the multifaceted social, cultural and political variables of grassroots Muslim communities throughout Spain.
Cultural and Demographic Variables in Recruitment Activity
The growth of micro-diaspora communities-predominantly formed of Maghrebis, Algerians and Pakistanis-is due to the continued influx of immigrants who travel to Spain for primarily family reasons and, therefore, employment. The importation of Salafist Islamist ideologies and jihadist sources of information, the growth of jihadist terrorist cells, radical imams, and the allure of defending the plight of the global umma have created new socio-cultural and ideological reference points for Spanish Muslims. Since before the March 11, 2004 Madrid attacks, Salafist Islamists have been using international and localized cultural variables to influence the attitudes and behaviors of Spanish Muslims toward radicalization. Cultural variables are physical and non-physical local cultural characteristics in a demographic environment that shape attitudes and behavior patterns in response to ideas, and include: -Physical transmitters: mosques, imams, educational institutions, books and tapes, family, social, prison and professional networks. This includes public spaces bordering ethnic and "native" communities.
-Non-physical transmitters: internet (online ideas), symbols and images, observable behaviors and activities, and codes of conduct.
Available information indicates that jihadist recruiters have been successful in exploiting cultural variables in distinct micro-diaspora communities to recruit Muslims in support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Spain, North Africa and elsewhere in Europe. This development is evidenced in the increased numbers of recruits to radicalization throughout Spain. For example, senior recruiters (typically the leaders of networks), spiritual leaders and explosives experts will identify, vet and then recruit new network or cell members for specialized activities, such as suicide operations, propaganda, or incorporation into logistical networks. As part of their recruitment tactics, recruiters seem to use different religious and socio-cultural variables to influence their recruits, and to facilitate their own integration into the micro-diaspora communities in which they are living and operating.
Spanish counter-terrorism operations and investigations into jihadist cells and their recruitment activities will provide useful insights into and context about the ways that radicalized actors manipulate cultural variables to their advantage.
Case Study: Cultural Variables in the Recruitment Patterns of 11-M and 2007 Barcelona Suicide Cell
In the cases of 11-M and the 2007 Barcelona terrorist plot, senior members were radicalized abroad and had direct links to militant Islamist organizations. They maintained a strong commitment to global jihad, were devoutly religious, and were able to successfully recruit and radicalize Spanish Muslims from various ethnic pools of diaspora communities.
The Dhadah Network: Recruiters centered their recruitment activities at the Madrid Abu Bakr mosque, and at social/ professional and religious gatherings to recruit sympathizers. Most of the Dhadah network's members shared professional, social and family connections. Dhadah used a sophisticated step process, similar to a recruitment process, to identify and vet. As part of his recruitment activities, Dhadah would pass out jihadist propaganda in mosques in and around Madrid. His network recruited circa 20 new members during the 1990s: some were sent to training camps in Afghanistan, some of whom returned to Spain or traveled to other jihad fronts.
In an attempt to identify prospective recruits, he studied the faces of people leaving the mosque after prayer sessions to approach those whom he considered to be of most interest. Once the potential of the individual was assessed, the recruiters would invite the individual to participate in innocuous meetings where they would discuss the situation of Islam. It is not clear from available information what the vetting process was for these members, or if the recruiters provided financial or other incentives (assistance with work, support to family members, etc.).
Barcelona Kamikaze Recruitment Cell:
In March 2007, Spanish security personnel broke up a jihadist recruitment cell that had trained and sent to Iraq an estimated 32 jihadist suicide bombers. Spanish National Police sources noted that the recruiter, Moroccan Mbark El Jaafari, used a strategy to "Westernize" his typically young recruits so that they could better integrate into Catalonian society. MARCH 2008 . Vol 1 . issue 4 "He purportedly encouraged the suicide bombers to wear jeans and modern dress, and to refrain from growing long beards."
He purportedly encouraged the suicide bombers to wear jeans and modern dress, and to refrain from growing long beards; he would then send the recruits to smaller towns in Catalonia where a "sponsor" would help them find employment. After this socio-demographic preparation, the "trainees" would travel to Iraq, Algeria, or Afghanistan. 3 Most recruits seem to be driven by two motivations: professional (to serve the global jihad), and spiritual and personal (a belief in martyrdom). While it is not clear from available information how strong the desire for martyrdom was for the recruits detained in Spain to date, the majority upheld an extreme religiosity. It is evident that Spanish Sunni Muslims are a recruitment target. What is not clear is what kind of Muslim becomes a target for jihadist recruiters, although the majority of recruitees have come into contact with the recruiters in shared religious and social networks. Some characteristics of potential recruits include:
Socio-Demographic Factors Radicalized
Spanish Muslims are predominantly young, first generation adult males who attend any number of Muslim social and religious settings. Many are middle class, have been educated in Spain (some have advanced technical degrees), have family, and are fluent in Spanish. Some have obtained Spanish citizenship, but the majority possess work permits. It is likely that these young recruits have a strong spirituality and probably navigate in Islamist ideological circles, particularly mosques and organizations, such as Tablighi Jama`at (JaT) of the 11-M and Barcelona '08 typology.
Authority Figures and Ideology
The imams and spiritual leaders recruiting for jihadist networks are marketing the religious concept of offensive jihad. Offensive jihad coincides remarkably with Abu Mus`ab al-Suri's strategic concept that emphasizes "individual terrorism" and urges that mass mobilization and participation in individual terrorism is necessary for the jihadist movement's success. 4 
Motivational Factors: Intent to Engage in Offensive Jihad
Detailed accounts of militant Islamists detained and imprisoned from 11-M to date indicate that the majority of jihadists were associated with Salafism prior to their radicalization to militant Islamism. 6 Experts now term these radicalized individuals as "neo-Salafists," whose basis of jihad is founded on "an inflexible and timeless reading of the Qur'an and the hadiths. Neo-Salafists are socialized in an intense hatred of those they consider to be infidels and, among other possible interpretations, they accept the most clearly bellicose definition of jihad, both in terms of defense and aggression. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Virtual and physical propaganda extolling the virtues of jihad could motivate curious, religiously motivated Muslims to seek out ideological and spiritual havens that lead them down the radicalization path.
A detailed window into the existence and strengthening of micro-diaspora communities is Jordi Moreras Palenzuela's singular examination of the dynamics of Catalonian Islam. His most recent work focuses on the El Raval neighborhood in Barcelona in which the recent JaTassociated Pakistani suicide bombing cell operated. El Raval is primarily dominated by Pakistanis who own their businesses, many that include women as business partners. The places of worship are predominantly Pakistani, and the Islamic expressions that are celebrated in the neighborhood are organized by Pakistani Muslims. In sum, El Raval is a nationalistic space in which politics (close ties to Pakistanis in Pakistan and the United Kingdom), religion, work and social life revolve around Pakistani elements. 8 According to a Spanish report, jihadist networks recruit approximately three Spanish Muslims a month from Catalonia for either suicide bombings in Iraq, or for training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and North Africa. 9 An emerging characteristic of the Spanish jihadist model is unaffiliated terrorists who are part of informal, Salafistinspired groups that are not formally linked to any one terrorist organization and operate in a "bee-hive" organizational infrastructure. These individuals tend to organize themselves around a commonly shared ideology of global jihad, one in which the religion of Islam is molded to serve their violent objectives. At times, small groups of "independently" inspired radical Muslims appear in villages and towns throughout Spain, especially in agricultural areas, to troll for recruits. These individuals operate exclusively within Spain to recruit young Muslims into jihad after they have settled in Spain, as opposed to relying on foreign jihadists. Some recruits are converts, hence the concern about homegrown terrorists. -Role and evolution of radical ideas. Transnational jihadist networks increasingly are influencing the perceptions, ideas and beliefs that contribute to the growth of Islamist radicalization and mobilization, and seek to target all Muslims in their global reach. Two important considerations should be noted: first, the appeal of neo-Salafism clearly has taken root in various diaspora communities that include both lower and middle classes; second, not all of the radicalized Spanish Muslims have been socially and economically marginalized. Therefore, it is crucial to understand in which ways religion and other doctrinal characteristics could be outweighing socioeconomic considerations in influencing shifting attitudes and behavior patterns toward radicalization. 10 10 Of course, Salafist movements will continue to target immigrant populations that are socially and economically excluded and live in marginalized diaspora societies.
-Current and future leadership of Muslim organizations. An understanding of who is emerging to inspire Spanish Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, in religious and intellectual ways is important for appreciating the future political and social sentiments of future generations of Spanish Muslims, especially those in positions of authority in religious and social organizations. Intra-ethnic tensions, which already play out in the competition among various Islamic and Islamist organizations, could cause a splintering between groups and their followers in crucial areas such as support for Islamic law. There are overt and subtle indicators of wedging for counterterrorism operators to evaluate, the most important variable being the use of rhetoric in media and non-media sources, and indications of social stratification in the micro-diaspora communities. 11 -Changing role of the internet. A trend in Spain is the departure from "physical recruitment" activities toward virtual recruitment. CDs, laptops (11-M) and the internet are driving self-recruitment activity. Nonetheless, at some point, a spiritual leader has, thus far, been needed to further guide the young recruits toward deeper spiritual lessons. To date, almost all of the major jihadist networks had created structured recruitment activities; it is difficult to ascertain the a priori exposure of the recruitees to internet recruitment, to Islamist ideologues such as Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, or to radical Islamic messages. For example, a Burgos jihadist indoctrinization cell was the first plot detected and broken up in Spain that followed and promoted global jihad via the internet. 12 -Strengthening of "mobile jihad satellite platforms" 13 that can only exist based on a grassroots support base. The primary nodes in this model are Barcelona, Madrid, Andalusia and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The members of these jihadist networks are multiethnic and interconnected not only with each other, but with other jihadist networks in Europe. For example, senior members 11 The author has developed a methodoligal approach to identify and weight the cultural variables that influence radicalized attitudes and behaviors. of the 11-M and Abu Dhadah networks not only interacted closely, but maintained ties with several members of the Hamburg cell. 14 To date, all members of the jihadist networks have demonstrated a commitment to both regional (Iraq, North Africa) and local (Spain) jihads. This dual operational and doctrinal capability to carry out terrorist attacks becomes akin to a borderless entity and poses tough challenges to Spanish and European counter-terrorism operations.
-Increase in suicide bombing tactics and techniques. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb and Pakistani jihadists who have trained in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are bringing back not only ideological and recruitment tactics from the international jihad, but also the combat techniques, such as IEDs, suicide bombings and potential chemical attacks. The Spanish Guardia Civil has assessed the January 2008 suicide cell in Barcelona as having an identical profile to the London group that perpetrated the 2005 attacks. 15
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That said, the comparison between the IDF and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps is admittedly tempting. Following Israel's 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon, the IDF grew accustomed to operations in the Palestinian Territories which, in some ways, closely resemble the counter-insurgency operations currently being undertaken by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in Iraq. The IDF then grew complacent and rusty. Furthermore, although many units performed admirably in southern Lebanon, as a whole the IDF was caught off-guard by the kind of fighting they experienced there. The reserves, especially, were poorly prepared and inadequately equipped.
There are several reasons, however, why this analogy does not hold as much water as some would like. First, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are not the IDF. Whereas the U.S. military, post-Vietnam, is a professional military, the IDF is still largely manned by conscripts. While the IDF soldier's ferocity, patriotism and tactical decision-making have often been noted as being among his strengths, individual soldier discipline is rarely mentioned as a trait for which the IDF soldier is praised. Some units take particular pride in their indiscipline and scruffy appearance. This may have positive effects on morale in some cases. Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate on the battlefield. 3 It is hard to imagine a U.S. Marine Corps gunnery sergeant allowing a similar situation.
In the same way, it is similarly hard to imagine the U.S. military's professional and non-commissioned officer corps allowing the kind of institutional complacency that haunted the IDF in the years following 2000. Simply put, the cultural differences between the U.S. military and the IDF-and the differences between conscripted armies and professional armies-must be taken into account before any comparison is made between historical experiences.
The greatest mistake the U.S. military can make in studying the lessons of 2006, however, is to study the 34 days of fighting that took place in southern Lebanon in July and August of that year without any context. Nevertheless, this seems to be what is happening.
In January, during a conference in which the author participated at the U.S. Army War College on what lessons can be drawn from the conflict with respect to information operations, Hizb Allah was widely considered to have cleverly manipulated the media during the conflict. Yet, if one were to ask Hizb Allah about their information operations during the conflict, the internal assessment would be much more negative. Indeed, during the 34 days of fighting, Hizb Allah's performance in the sphere of information operations was uneven. Where Hizb Allah enjoyed the most success in information operations was in the years before the conflict-carefully setting the conditions within which the battle would be foughtand in the weeks and months after the shooting stopped. The information operations campaign is not confined to a 34-day window of time, and an attempt to understand Hizb Allah's success in that field is doomed to fail if confined as such.
In the same way, the U.S. military's insistence upon only studying the tactical lessons provided by the 34 days of open fighting between the IDF and Hizb Allah is also misguided. As U.S. Army Captain Daniel Helmer persuasively argues in his study of the IDF's failed counterinsurgency efforts in southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, Israel never dealt with 3 Personal interviews, IDF officers, November 2006 and January 2008.
Drawing the Right Lessons from Israel's War with Hizb Allah
By andrew exum a recent article in USA Today announced that the U.S. military was learning from Israel's 2006 war against Hizb Allah in southern Lebanon. The lesson, at first, seems to be clear. "Counterinsurgency tactics," USA Today reported, "could leave U.S. forces vulnerable to the kind of coordinated attacks that stymied Israel." 1 Echoing these concerns and writing in World Politics Review on March 4, West Point professor Gian Gentile argued that the U.S. Army had already become like the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), "so focused on irregular and counterinsurgency warfare that it can no longer fight large battles against a conventional enemy." 2 Is this true, and is the U.S. military drawing the correct lessons from the 2006 war?
It is impossible to gauge the degree to which the U.S. Army's conventional combat skills have been eroded by the focus on counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is certainly likely that the high operations tempo, endless deployments and shortened training schedules have more to do with any erosion in collective task proficiencies than counter-insurgency manual FM 3-24. Yet, the U.S. military is almost certainly drawing the wrong lessons from the 2006 war if it is used to ignore the hard won lessons of counter-insurgency and revert back to the kind of conventional warfighting with which the U.S. military has always been more comfortable.
Drawing the wrong lessons has happened before. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the presence of a conventional threat from the Soviet Union allowed the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to shelve the counter-insurgency lessons learned during more than a decade of fighting in Southeast Asia. Counter-insurgency warfare, as John Nagl is fond of saying, is "graduate level warfare." Intellectually, then, it was easier for the U.S. Army officer corps to go back to defending the the root political problems in southern Lebanon that led to the rise of Hizb Allah. 4 The 2006 war did not take place in a 34-day vacuum; it was merely the latest bloodshed in a dispute between Israel and Hizb Allah that has been fought with varying degrees of intensity since 1982.
The 2006 war was not evidence, then, that Israel had over-learned the lessons of counter-insurgency, but rather the opposite: Israel has never effectively learned counter-insurgency in the first place. Even in the West Bank and Gaza, the IDF continues to approach the fighting there as a counter-terrorism mission instead of a counter-insurgency mission. Moreover, while the presence of both a radicalized settler population and historical animosities might preclude the application of an effective counterinsurgency strategy in the Occupied Territories, Israel has never developed and applied counter-insurgency doctrine along the lines of FM 3-24 despite years of experience in irregular warfare dating back to Jewish guerrilla groups in prestate Israel.
Finally, unless the Mexican government dissolves and a modern-day Pancho Villa begins to lob Katyusha rockets across the border into Texas, it is unlikely the U.S. military will ever face an adversary exactly like Hizb Allah. Yet, in more general terms, Israel's war against Hizb Allah belongs to the kind of conflicts that political scientist Erin Simpson labels "hybrid wars." 5 These wars occur when nation-states go to war against non-state or sub-state actors and combine elements of conventional warfare with characteristics of irregular warfare. Although air power enthusiasts such as Major General Charles Dunlap have argued for a more robust use of air power in unconventional war, historical evidence suggests that air power based punishment strategies such as that employed by Israel in 2006 are not effective against guerrilla groups in hybrid wars. 
Mastering
hybrid warfare means mastering the tactics found in both FM 3-24 and FM 7-8. U.S. Army and Marine Corps units must be proficient in both conventional combined arms combat as well as the kind of population-centric approach encapsulated in the new counterinsurgency doctrine. This is clearly asking a lot of the officer corps, but perhaps not any more than what has been asked of it already in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Hybrid warfare also means civilian and strategic decision-makers must be realistic about what military power alone can accomplish in such conflicts. By all accounts, the IDF was sent into southern Lebanon with an impossible mission-to "destroy" Hizb Allah. By 2006, however, Hizb Allah had grown into a politicalmilitary organization claiming the loyalty of perhaps 1.5 million Lebanese Shi`a. Hizb Allah runs schools, manages hospitals and elects members of parliament. No military on the planet could have been expected to destroy the organization in 34 days of fighting.
In some wars, history teaches us that you cannot shoot or kill your way to victory. As U.S. Army Colonel H.R. McMaster has written, "the principal lesson of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and southern Lebanon might be that military campaigns must be subordinate to a larger strategy that integrates political, military, diplomatic, economic and strategic communication efforts." 7 Guns, bombs and tactics from the Second World War are simply not enough. This has been the harsh lesson of the U.S. military's counter-insurgency campaigns since 2001, and this is also the enduring lesson of Israel's war with Hizb Allah. 
Guest Commentary: Benazir Bhutto's Doomed Return to Pakistan
By James r. ellis, lt. Gen. u.s. army (ret.) two months have passed since Benazir Bhutto's assassination. After listening to the news and commentary, I decided to offer a personal perspective having spent two years in Pakistan during the period of Bhutto's first term as prime minister.
My assignment to Pakistan was in response to the August 1988 plane crash that killed President Zia ul-Haq, more than a dozen of his government officials, U.S. Ambassador Arnie Raphel, and the senior U.S. military officer in the country, Army Brigadier General Herb Wassom. After the crash, my wife and I were rushed to Islamabad where I replaced General Wassom. At that time, there were several key issues at stake: heightened tensions between Pakistan and India (over Kashmir and other concerns); operation of a multibillion dollar Military Assistance Program; the investigation into the cause of the plane crash; and support for the Afghan "freedom fighters" (mujahidin) opposing both the invading Soviet Army and the puppet communist government in Kabul (although this was not within my charter, I did get to know many of the U.S., Pakistani and Afghan leaders of that effort). One immediate goal was encouraging the Pakistani military to support the return to civilian government, and it was the subsequent election that fall which brought Bhutto to power.
Pakistan has a most unique culture formed by more than 4,000 years of South Asian (Hindu) history, 1,300 years of Islamic religion and 200 years of British rule. It is surrounded by Afghanistan, Iran, India, China and the former Soviet Union-a tough neighborhood. Internal strife is the norm, suspicion of and conflict with India is a constant, and the border area with Afghanistan is as wild as any place in the world. No one (Alexander the Great, India, Russia, or Britain) has ever been able to control the region or the tribes there, nor can the current Pakistani government. The several times I visited the area, I was always with a Pakistani Army escort. The U.S. press and many policymakers are relatively uninformed about the culture, geography and demography of this country that is so key to the "war on terrorism" and to stability in a critical region of the world. Also, it should not be forgotten that Pakistan is an Islamic country and more than 99.5% of the population (160 million) is Muslim.
I met Bhutto a few times during her first term. She was personable and engaging, but had problems governing due to persistent accusations that she and her family were corrupt. In fact, it was charges of corruption that led to her removal from the prime minister position on two occasions. There are strong allegations that the Bhutto family stole billions from the national treasury and government contracts while she was in office. Her husband was known as "Mr. Ten Percent," meaning that if one wanted to do business with the government of Pakistan they had to pay him 10% of the contract. He spent several years in jail on corruption charges.
Bhutto had many enemies-including some members of her own family who believed that she was involved in the death of at least one of her brothers. Also, her political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), is only one of several vying for power. Many groups had a motive for her assassination.
Bhutto had been a darling of the U.S. press, and from her return to Pakistan until her assassination the media failed to present her in a balanced manner. If Bhutto's full history had been highlighted ahead of her return, there would have been less hope in the West that she would "restore democracy" and a greater realization that her return was fraught with danger. It has been reported that the U.S. State Department brokered her return as a way of bolstering U.S. and international support for Pakistan and its continued assistance in the war on terrorism. Now, as a result of her assassination, this move could backfire, a consequence that should have been foreseen.
Some pundits have railed against Pakistan's inability to protect a political candidate. Yet, from the time it was announced that Bhutto would return it was a foregone conclusion that assassination attempts would be made against her. Given the way she mingled with the crowds and the fact that crowd control in the country is extremely difficult, it was only a matter of time before someone or some group was successful. Indeed, before criticizing other governments for failure to provide security to their political leaders, we should look at our own history to see how difficult this can be. The United States has had four presidents assassinated in its history, and there have been many assassination attempts against sitting presidents and presidential candidates. Just in the 60 years since Pakistan became a separate country (1947), the United States has seen the assassination of both President John F. Kennedy and presidential candidate Senator Bobby Kennedy. Additionally, there were more than a half-dozen other assassination attempts, including the shooting of President Ronald Reagan. This country, however, has been strong enough to survive such violence without destroying our constitution or our democratic values. Now, the United States must look beyond Bhutto's assassination because a more serious concern is the future stability of Pakistan, and the guaranteed security of the country's several dozen nuclear weapons.
While
Americans deplore the assassination and resulting violence and desire movement toward a more democratic society, it is my assessment that we cannot afford to turn away from Pakistan. We must-for our own national interests-maintain our influence there by supporting whatever government emerges from the recent elections. Of equal importance, we must continue to support the Pakistani Army if we are to have success in neighboring Afghanistan and in maintaining continued stability in the region. Many in the West do not wish to accept the fact that Pakistan's Army is the strongest and most enduring institution in the country and is the greatest source of internal stability; during previous periods of government by elected prime ministers, it was the Army's decision whether or not to back the government that determined its lifespan and success. The reason, according to al-Janabi, is due to "organized assassinations by the coalition forces." Speaking about an incident earlier in the day in which he claimed three of his Awakening Council members were killed by gunfire from a U.S. helicopter, "It was the third incident in a month. We have lost 19 men while 12 have been injured because of coalition attacks." -AFP, February 17 The Taliban released a statement warning the four cell phone companies that operate in Afghanistan to cease operating every night between 5 PM and 7 AM. The Taliban stated that NATO and U.S. forces were tracking the movement and location of their fighters through cell phone signals, in addition to intercepting their cellular transmissions. If the companies fail to cease operations between the time period specified, the statement warns that the Taliban will target "their offices, suboffices and tower stations." -New York Times, February 26 In the 215-page book, Zawahiri attacks the "revisions" of a number of former radical Islamist leaders who have spoken publicly against certain al-Qa`ida tactics, especially suicide bombings and attacks that kill large numbers of civilians. In the book, titled Exonerations, Zawahiri says that "this message that I present to the reader today is the most difficult, if not the hardest I have written in my life," and argues that former jihadist ideologues who have come out publicly against al-Qa`ida's violent tactics are serving "the interests of the Crusader-Zionist alliance with the Arab leaders to drug the mujahidin and drag them away from the confrontation." -AP, March 3 March 3, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): The Saudi Arabian government announced that 28 al-Qa`ida suspects were recently apprehended under suspicion of planning to launch a "terrorist campaign" inside the country. The group was part of the same plot that involved an earlier set of 28 arrests in December. According to the Interior Ministry, there are now 56 suspected individuals part of the plot, and some of them were in direct contact with al-Qa`ida's senior leadership, including Ayman al-Zawahiri. According to the ministry, "They were instructed to rebuild the deviant organization and launch a terrorist campaign inside Saudi Arabia. Preparations for these criminal plans had reached advanced stages." -AFP, March 3 
